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Act Naturally: Francis Ponge’s Morals and Measures of Human Nature
Hugh Hochman
Reed College
Poetry in the 20th century, in keeping with other forms of modern thought,
had its own ways of undermining anthropocentric assumptions about the
relationship between objects and human consciousness. The decentering of the
human subject from the operations of the world is at work in contestations of lyric
as the expressive mode of a sovereign self, or in the inscription of the poetic subject
in a world of things. Resistance to the anthropocentric legacy of Descartes’s res
cogitans could hardly be more robustly demonstrated in poetry than it is by the
French poet Francis Ponge, well known for the aesthetic and philosophical
commitments of his poetics of ordinary objects. Within a literary tradition that often
thematizes the limits of human reason and linguistic conventions, Ponge’s work,
which he characterized as a phenomenological dictionary (Proêmes 218) in his
essay on Camus and the absurd, is a rich site of reflection on how language
expresses and regulates the relationship of human beings to an environment
populated by nonhuman things. Look no further than the first poem of his most
famous collection, Le Parti pris des choses (‘In Favor of Things’), published in
1942. In this poem, “Pluie” (‘Rain’), we find the pronoun “je” ‘I’ exactly once, in
the first sentence, indicating an observer of the natural phenomenon of rain falling
in a courtyard: “La pluie, dans la cour où je la regarde tomber, descend à des allures
très diverses” (15) ‘Rain, in the courtyard where I watch it fall, comes down at
varying speeds.’1 Ponge’s collection opens with the poetic subject, susceptible to
appearances (that the properties of raindrops vary depending on the distance from
the observer), checking in on the world outside, a trope of a supposedly oncesovereign human interiority turned inside out in favor of the things of the nonhuman
world. But despite its contingent and relative apprehension of natural phenomena,
the human subject resists complete erasure from the grammatical surface and the
deeper rhetorical structures of this poem, which ends by conjoining the natural
event and human enjoyment within the insoluble ambivalence of a shared past
participle: “il a plu” (16) ‘it has rained/pleased.’ For Ponge, the inalienably human
practice of language inevitably enacts human ends, and this essay explores how his
poetics has as its end the happiness of human beings acting in accordance with their
nature and the nature of things.
A poetics of the nonhuman is inevitably encumbered by the traces, or signs,
of the human linguistic project that enacts it. As practitioners of such a poetics
pursue the aesthetic goal of figuring the nonhuman—for instance manmade or
1
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natural objects or substances, or nonhuman inhabitants of the natural world—the
forms and regimes of human meaning persist as the remainder in a poetic operation
that can only gesture beyond its margins. In “Raisons de vivre heureux” (‘Reasons
to Live Happy’), Ponge locates the limit of a poetic project that aspires to describe
objects “de leur propre point de vue” ‘from their own point of view,’ remarking
famously that, “Il y a toujours du rapport à l’homme. . . . l’on ne peut aucunement
sortir de l’homme” ‘There is always some relation to man. . . . one cannot get
outside of man’ (Proêmes 198). When Ponge reformulates this remark in “Faune et
flore” (‘Fauna and Flora’) as “L’on ne peut sortir de l’arbre par des moyens d’arbre”
(Parti 43) ‘One cannot get outside of trees by tree-like means,’ we see that even
our figures of the nonhuman leave us perpetually enclosed within our own
practices. Ponge is, of course, hardly unique in negotiating such contradictions.
Yves Bonnefoy’s Du mouvement et de l’immobilité de Douve (‘On the Movement
and Immobility of Douve’), for instance, figures the demise of the lyric subject by
inscribing the poetic text in a virtual space where representation cancels itself, “où
se déchire le poème” (62) ‘where the poem tears itself up’ or “à une profondeur où
les images ne prennent plus” (57) ‘at a depth where images no longer take.’ But the
problem remains double: on the one hand, things are not captured by the language
we set aside for them, and on the other hand, they can make us overlook the human
language of the somewhat social relation we have with them, their “rapport à
l’homme”—our experience and the act of representation— “wherein,” as Bill
Brown argues, “modernity’s ontological distinction between human beings and
nonhumans makes no sense” (451). “If commodities could speak” Marx speculated
in Capital (176), and we sometimes forget they cannot, or as Ponge reminds us in
Proêmes: “Ce ne sont pas les choses qui parlent entre elles mais les hommes entre
eux qui parlent des choses” (Proêmes 198) ‘It’s not things that speak among
themselves, but human beings that speak among themselves about things.’ How are
we to assess, in the poetics of the nonhuman, the insurmountably human?
Recent scholarship on Ponge has fruitfully pointed to how the incomplete
apprehension of the material excess or otherness of the nonhuman poses not only
an aesthetic challenge for the text but an ethical opportunity for human subjects that
would renounce or denounce their imprint on the nonhuman world that their
expressions figure. Vanessa Robinson argues that language, “rather than acting as
a marker of human superiority, becomes the means by which we recognize the
essential otherness of different species” (29). But without restoring convictions of
human superiority to the natural world, we may also cite as an ethical end of
Ponge’s work the recognition that, though it impedes various human projects, the
otherness of nature’s substance and nonhuman species need not lead to our unhappy
renunciation of these projects altogether. The poetic subject inscribed at the end of
the final poem of Le Parti pris des choses, “Le Galet” (‘The Seashore Stone’), is
struck silent—“Je n’en dirai pas plus” (Parti 56) ‘I’ll say no more’—at the idea of
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the traces washed away from the surface of the stone: “car cette idée d’une
disparition de signes me donne à réfléchir sur les défauts d’un style qui appuie trop
sur les mots” (56) ‘for this idea of a disappearance of signs makes me reflect on the
shortcomings2 of a style that relies too much on words.’ Though surely a reflection
on the text not being stone enough, this passage also expresses the human excess
(words as de trop), symmetrical to the irreducible remainder of stone never captured
by the text. It is the supplement of a human subject whose projects, though they do
not wholly capture the material world, are not wholly effaced, not even by the selfeffacing humility at the end of the text. Writing recently on “Le Galet,” Julian
Murphet cites the material horizon that limits all efforts to transcend it, and argues
that in the poem “the only residue of God lies in the very powers of intellection and
humility that can adduce such a horizon in the first place, without falling victim to
melancholy, rage, or resignation” (1506). Indeed, for Ponge equilibrium of humility
and pride restores us to our proper rank, which is not a matter of esteem but of
human well-being. In his “Notes premières de ‘L’Homme’” (‘Preliminary Notes on
“Man”’) Ponge insists that “Il faut replacer l’homme à son rang dans la nature: il
est assez haut” ‘We have to restore man to his rank in nature: it is fairly high,’ and
although the human being judges nature to be absurd, Ponge urges, “Qu’il ne s’en
rende donc pas malade” ‘He should not make himself sick over it’ but find instead
an equilibrium within nature.
Qu’il se félicite plutôt: Il dispose de moyens pour:
10 s’y tenir en équilibre: l’instinct (semblable à celui de ces magots à
cul de plomb qui se redressent toujours), la science, la morale (c’est-à-dire
de la santé physique et mentale);
20 l’exprimer, la réfléchir, se défaire de tout complexe d’infériorité à son
égard: la littérature, les arts. (Proêmes 225)
Rather let him be happy: he has at his disposal the means to:
1. hold himself there in equilibrium: instinct (like one of those weighted
figurines that always return upright), science, morality (that is, physical and
mental health);
2. express it, reflect it, relieve himself of any inferiority complex about
it: literature, the arts.
Keeping in mind that a component of Ponge’s poetic project is to sidestep
a tragic interpretation of the absurd—“Bien entendu, la non-signification du
monde! Mais qu’y a-t-il là de tragique?” (Proêmes 213) ‘Granted, the nonsignification of the world. But what’s tragic about that?’—this essay argues that
2
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Ponge’s poetics of the nonhuman supports an ethical project of human well-being,
wherein we no longer have to take sides in the conflict between endless defeat and
claims of mastery. By exploring tropes of insufficiency or excess, of lesser or
greater than, of below or above, especially in texts in which the rhetoric of example
appears to take nature’s substances and other species as models for human
comportment, this essay aims to recuperate Ponge’s residual humanism, whereby
the human being unfolds its own nature, of which it is the sole measure, neither
greater nor lesser than the rest of nature.
There are, of course, canonical examples of the human subject in search of
its rank in nature. Pascal’s roseau pensant ‘thinking reed,’ for instance, surmounts
a vanishingly small presence in the universe by understanding what exceeds it: “Par
l’espace l’univers me comprend et m’engloutit comme un point, par la pensée je le
comprends” (150) ‘In space, the universe encompasses me and swallows me up like
a point, by thought I comprehend it.’ Unwilling to perform this conversion of
insignificance into “la grandeur de l’homme” (Pascal 149) ‘the greatness of man,’
Ponge resolved in “Notes premières de ‘L’Homme’”: “il faut que je relise Pascal
(pour le démolir)” (228) ‘I have to reread Pascal (to demolish him).’ On the other
hand, revealing a similar inclination to situate human beings in the cosmos, Ponge’s
poem “Le Pain” (‘Bread’) figures the vast and small dimensions that we inhabit,
and Ponge’s disinclination to resolve the dialectical conflict between them, in its
figurative logic. Because of a resemblance to mountainous landscapes— “à cause
de cette impression quasi panoramique qu’elle donne”3 ‘Because of this quasipanoramic impression that it provides’—the surface of the bread is “merveilleuse
d’abord” ‘a marvel to behold at first,’ “comme si l’on avait à sa disposition sous la
main les Alpes, le Taurus ou la Cordillère des Andes” (Parti 22) ‘as if one had at
one’s disposal the Alps, the Taurus, the Cordillera of the Andes.’ Although this
comparison reveals our tendency to revere nature’s sublime spectacles, which come
so readily to mind that they ennoble the ordinary objects of our domestic life, it also
suggests the opposite, that we tend to domesticate nature, and in this way it betrays
the mistaken impression (for it is only “as if”) of the human observer that all of
nature is “à sa disposition,” an ambivalence that organizes the figures of the poem’s
opening two sentences. Whereas bread, an object of daily consumption, is the tenor
in the first sentence (cited above) and the landscape is the vehicle, the poem
reverses the comparison in the second sentence, where “Ainsi donc une masse
amorphe en train d’éructer fut glissée pour nous dans le four stellaire” (Parti 22,

It has often been suggested that panoramique ‘panoramic’ is a pun based on a phonic similarity
to “pain” ‘bread’ with bread replacing the Greek “pan” ‘everything.’ This linguistic account of the
dominant trope of the text does not alter the present reading.
3
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my emphasis) ‘Thus it was that an amorphous, belching mass was slid into the
heavenly oven for us’ makes the domestic environment the vehicle and the cosmos
the tenor, completing a symmetry that recalls Pascal’s double infinity. Unsure
where we stand between the literal and figurative poles, between the domestic and
the cosmic spaces, we human beings summon, not a thinking reed’s dialectical
solution, but instead “ce pouvoir vivre entre deux infinis” (Proêmes 229, emphasis
in the original) ‘this ability to live between two infinities.’ Ponge’s conviction that
“Il faut réintégrer l’idée de Dieu à l’idée de l’homme. Et simplement vivre”
(Proêmes 228) ‘We have to reintegrate the idea of God into the idea of man. And
simply live’ is expressed in the assimilation of bread (including its religious
signification) to our vital functions rather than to our symbolic operations. “Mais
brisons-la: car le pain doit être dans notre bouche moins objet de respect que de
consommation”4 (Parti 23) ‘But let’s break bread: for bread in our mouths must be
less an object of respect than of consumption’ is a response to the contradiction
between our reverence for the natural contexts that humble our modern poetic urges
and an exalting conviction (“thus it was”) that the planet was made for us, one that
has a long history with powerful precedents, such as the Encyclopédie
(‘Encyclopedia’) of Diderot and d’Alembert.
Si l'on bannit l'homme ou l'être pensant & contemplateur de dessus la
surface de la terre ; ce spectacle pathétique & sublime de la nature n'est plus
qu'une scene triste & muette. L'univers se taît ; le silence & la nuit s'en
emparent. (Encyclopédie 5:641)
If we banish man or the thinking and contemplating being from the face of
the earth, this moving and sublime spectacle of nature is nothing but a sad
and dead scene. The universe goes quiet: silence and night take hold.
The situation is the reverse for Ponge. The thinking and contemplating
human being seeks admittance to the natural environment from the things that
remain silent. Acknowledging “les choses [qui] se taisent” ‘the things that stay
quiet,’ Ponge invites us “en leur honneur à faire observer une minute de silence. . . .
Pour savoir d’elles si elles nous admettent, si elles nous tolèrent sans trop de
rancœur ni de dégoût” (Méthodes 658) ‘in their honor to observe a moment of
silence. . . . To know if they admit us, if they tolerate us without too much rancor
or disgust.’ Language can block us from taking our place in nature, and in opposite
ways. Either language risks running roughshod over its material object, or material
nature leaves us tongue-tied, as in Le Pré (‘The Meadow’) where, disposed as he is

4
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toward “[le] pré que je veux dire” (340) ‘the meadow I want to say,’ the narrator
quickly finds his progress on the page, and across the meadow, to be blocked:
Mais qu’est-ce qui obstrue ainsi notre chemin?
....
Pourquoi, dès notre issue en surplomb sur la page,
Dans ce seul paragraphe, tous ces scrupules? (341)
But what is this now in our way?
....
Why, as soon as we set out over the page,
In this one paragraph alone, all these scruples?
These scrupules—from the Latin scrupulum, meaning pebble, such as the sort we
might feel painfully in our shoe—impede our twin projects of traversing and talking
about nature.5 Ponge imagines us welcomed by the nonhuman, but for our sake as
much as anything, and this is unmistakably an ethical aim:
Si j’ai choisi de parler de la coccinelle c’est par dégoût des idées. Mais
ce dégoût des idées? C’est qu’elles ne me viennent pas à bonheur, mais à
malheur. (Proêmes 213)
If I have chosen to speak of the ladybug, it is out of disgust for ideas.
But this disgust for ideas? It’s because I have them not happily, but
unhappily.
Happiness, the overall end achieved by autotelic human action in eudaimonist
thinking, is the overall end of poetry for Ponge: “L’on devrait pouvoir à tous
poèmes donner ce titre : Raisons de vivre heureux” (Proêmes 197) ‘We should be
able to give all poems this title: Reasons to live happy.’6 Poems bear within them a
For this insight, and for much else, I am indebted to Steven Winspur. See La Poésie du lieu (‘Poetry
of Place’). “A ces moments-là le corps nous fait défaut, notre pied résiste tout en nous rappelant que
nous sommes bel et bien un animal de chair qui se déplace sur la terre, un corps parmi d’autres plutôt
qu’une conscience abritée du hasard et capable de tout” (81) ‘At these moments, the body fails us,
our foot resists while at the same time reminding us that we are indeed an animal of flesh that moves
across the land, a body among others rather than a consciousness sheltered from chance and capable
of anything.’
6
See Winspur, “La Poéthique de Ponge” (‘Ponge’s Poethics’). “L’activité de ‘vivre heureux’ devrait
donc trouver sa justification profonde dans chaque poème (et non seulement dans ceux qu’un poète
aurait écrits à cet effet), ce qui souligne le rapport réciproque qui existe entre le déchiffrement des
formules poétiques et la construction continue par les lecteurs (y compris l’écrivain) d’une forme
de vie qui est particulière à chacun d’eux” (243) ‘the activity of “living happily” should therefore
5
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logic of human actions oriented toward overcoming the various kinds of
unhappiness resulting from our own endeavors, and it comes from a certain
orientation of our bodies and our intellectual faculties toward each other, and
toward the material world around us, the reconciliation arising at the moment when,
as Ponge puts it, human beings “[perdent] à peu près la parole” (Méthodes 631)
‘just about lose speech.’ Not losing speech altogether but only nearly, or more or
less, we may, with the example of poetic language, quiet the claims of dominion
and the concessions of defeat, and instead feel at home in ‘le monde muet . . . notre
seule patrie” (631) ‘the mute world . . . our only homeland.’
The geological story narrated in Ponge’s poem “Le Galet,” is the formation
and ongoing disaggregation of an ancient or antediluvian unity. This story
implicitly raises a question of whether, in a larger narrative of natural history,
human beings have emerged on the landscape as a species presiding over nature
through their ideational projects of individuating and defining nature’s elements
and inhabitants, and reflecting on their place in nature. From the start of the poem,
the outlook is not good, and various forms of hedging ensue. “Le Galet” is a story
of compromises, deficiencies, and failures of a human epistemological project
oriented toward talking about stone in universal claims with ultimate legislative
authority. Since, as the first sentence concedes, “Le galet n’est pas une chose facile
à bien définir” (Parti 49) ‘The stone is not an easy thing to define well,’ one might
consider settling for a description—“Si l’on se contente d’une simple description”
(49) ‘If we settle for a simple description’—though that, too, leads to problems,
specifically the questionable legitimation of a discourse that relates words, objects,
and ideas: “Mais ce propos déjà indique de la pierre une notion qui doit être
justifiée” (50, my emphasis) ‘But this remark already indicates a notion of stone
that needs justification.’ And all this wanting for notions makes one susceptible to
mistaking figures for nature: “A l’esprit en mal de notions qui s’est d’abord nourri
de telles apparences, à propos de la pierre la nature apparaîtra enfin, sous un jour
peut-être trop simple, comme une montre dont le principe est fait de roues qui
tournent à de très inégales vitesses” (53) ‘To the mind wanting for notions, having
first fed on such appearances, when it comes to stone, nature will ultimately appear,
in perhaps too simple a light, as a watch whose principle is made of gears that turn
at very unequal speeds.’ This well-worn metaphor of the clockwork cosmos in
natural philosophy is a parodic form of Derrida’s usure ‘wear/ usury,’ the unlimited
currency of metaphor passing for philosophy’s universal concepts, metaphor “qui
cache et se cache” (251) ‘that hides and hides itself.’ For what could be more
apparent than the transparent historicity of this mere but unmistakable appearance?
find its deep justification in each poem (and not just in those a poet might have written to this end),
which underlines the reciprocal relationship that exists between the deciphering of poetic formulas
and the ongoing construction by readers (authors included) of a form of life particular to each of
them.’
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And so like the painful pebble of Le Pré, resisting figuration, the sensible
materiality of stone asserts itself to the body, not the esprit ‘mind’, for when a grain
of sand blown by the wind manages to get “réellement dans nos yeux, c’est ainsi
que la pierre punit et termine notre contemplation” (Parti 52) ‘really in our eyes,
this is how stone punishes and ends our contemplation.’ At first figuratively in our
eyes, and then physically—or really—so, “l’objet qui nous occupe” (52) ‘the object
that occupies us’ exchanges one occupation for another, defeating us in the moment
of our contemplative gaze on the landscape and punishing us the only way it can,
with its materiality, and in collaboration with our own. Discomfort, distortions,
banality, and settling for less, each a different area of human unhappiness, are the
results so far. In the end, however, although the narrator appears as the loser in the
epistemological story, when he imagines his future critics looking back and saying,
“Ayant entrepris d’écrire une description de la pierre, il s’empêtra” (56) ‘Having
set out to write a description of the stone, he got entangled,’ he nevertheless
achieves a felicitous end, when Derrida’s etymon, the imprint of a lost primitive
meaning, makes a poetic appearance in the false etymology of the overdetermined
result written in stone, so to speak: “il s’empêtra.”7 “Trop heureux seulement
d’avoir pour ces débuts su choisir le galet” (56) ‘All too happy merely to have
chosen the stone for this first try,’ he cannot help but smile—as if in trying to
describe stone, one can only meet a petrifying end—snatching a poetic victory from
the jaws of defeat.
If such poetic consolations are possible, having nature “à notre disposition”
in poetic texts may be a more ambivalent posture than it seemed at first, reflecting
our conflicting commitments about nature: that on the one hand it is subordinated
to us and at our disposal, and that on the other hand our own (human) nature is
disposed toward nature writ large in ways we have yet to realize, as the opening to
Le Pré suggests.
Que parfois la Nature, à notre réveil, nous propose
Ce à quoi justement nous étions disposés. (Le Pré 340)
Let Nature sometimes, as we awake, propose to us
Precisely that to which we were disposed.
The goal is to unfold this natural disposition of ours in such a way that we no longer
remain “dès l’abord . . . interdits” (341) ‘from the start . . . forbidden/speechless,’
achieving a linguistic felicity, not by expressing our dominion over nature in
definitions, laws, or the lost, utopian unity of word and thing, but rather by figuring
S’empêtra is an inflected form of the verb s’empêtrer, which is etymologically unrelated to the
Latin “petra” ‘stone.’
7
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nothing more—or less—than its resistance. “Le Galet” ends this way, with the “Je
n’en dirai pas plus” that leads to the narrator not exactly uttering a bon mot, leaving
the folly of having the last word to his critics, but having instead the last laugh, with
the immobilizing entanglement that accomplishes the comic reversal of the tragic
romance of defeated reason.8 Adjusting its ends at first from definition to
description to legitimation, the poem eventually figures stone as the material that
defies all ends, being the only thing in nature “qui y meure constamment” (Parti
53) ‘that constantly dies there,’ and in doing so, the poem shows “l’art de résister
aux paroles” (Proêmes 193) ‘the art of resisting words’ by its own resistance
(“contrairement à l’opinion commune” [Parti 53] ‘contrary to what is commonly
thought’) to the petrifications of doxa, to the too-permanent, worn-out metaphor of
rock as permanence. “Le Galet” ultimately changes altogether the ends that we
pursue with language, its subversion of the lure a non-rhetorical discourse having
no end other than itself. All too happy at the end to have chosen the difficult stone
from the start; “Le Galet” is an example of an autotelic act.
These changes in linguistic aims provide a template for reorganizing other
ends that we pursue. For instance, consider the competing modes of happiness, or
pleasure, in the poem “Les Plaisirs de la porte” (‘The Pleasures of the Door’). The
first mode depends on recognition of a universal claim, not merely a statement but
an injunction, uttered in the name of political authority—“Les rois ne touchent pas
aux portes” (Parti 21) ‘Kings don’t touch doors’—and is that which is done “au
plaisir du roi” ‘at the pleasure of the king.’ The second mode belongs to the valet,
or the rest of us: “[Les rois] ne connaissent pas ce bonheur d’empoigner au ventre
par son nœud de porcelaine l’un de ces hauts obstacles d’une pièce, ce corps à corps
rapide” (21) ‘[Kings] do not know this happiness of grabbing one of these great
obstacles of a room right in the belly by its porcelain knob, this quick body-tobody.’ This is the happiness of an action done for its own sake. The door
participates in both. In the first case, it is the object that structures the order of the
court through the ritual of valets, not kings, opening doors, and that along with the
subject, produces or legitimates the king. In the second case, the happiness is
produced by the mutual embrace of the subject’s material qualities and those of the
object, all of which are the opposite of “the immaterial excess that differentiates a
royal body from its brute physicality,” as Bill Brown puts it in “The Tyranny of
Things” (458), a body that is missing from the text and that precisely does not act.
But by restoring to our imagination a political order that we only recognize as
révolu ‘long gone,’ this text is the opposite of revolution and the establishment of
a radical material equality. “Les rois ne touchent pas aux portes” sits atop the text,
forbidding democracy, “le copieusement habité lieu commun” (Parti 30)
Julian Murphet identifies in this poem “the comic resuscitations and regenerations of the
contemptible organic cycles” (1505).
8
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‘copiously inhabited commonplace’ in “Bords de mer” (‘Seashores’), the realm of
cliché that Ponge famously views with suspicion.9 Any equality here is
asymmetrical (the door acquiring a body, and a belly10) and short-lived, resolved
back into the reign of the subject: “D’une main amicale [le corps] la retient encore
avant de la repousser décidément et s’enclore” (21, my emphasis) ‘With a friendly
hand [the body] holds it open a moment before pushing it away brusquely and
shutting itself back inside.’ “On ne peut aucunement sortir de l’homme” (Proêmes
198) ‘we cannot step outside of man,’ which is to say into an apolitical realm of
pure materiality, since the fleeting pleasure transforms the materiality of ‘one of
these great obstacles’ into a passage, and back again into clôture ‘enclosure.’
Though it reveals the contingency of authority, reminding us that “the difference
between democracy and monarchy is an illusion” (467), as Bill Brown argues, the
text does not liberate the object once and for all from human projects. Instead, the
object is reenlisted in actions done for their own sake by a subject that is ethical,
not political, in nature, a pursuit of happiness neglected by those whose actions are
not self-legitimating.
The king is dead, or illusory, long live the king! As an example to us all of
unhappiness. The authority of his example is enduring and universal, valid in all
contexts, even those, like this text and our daily lives, without royal bodies.
Bertrand Russell worried whether “The king of France is bald” is true or false given
that France is a Republic (Russell concluded it was false). To consider the truth
conditions of “kings don’t touch doors” is to overlook its force. Neither true nor
false, it has as a perlocutionary effect to make us see (or say) what we already know,
not that kings do not touch doors (for who can say?), but that we often do. When
Ponge famously remarked, “Je désire moins aboutir à un poème qu’à une formule”
‘My goal is less a poem than a formula,’ he understood the formule as “capable
d’effets pratiques” (Pratiques 1029) ‘capable of pragmatic effects.’ Taking his
examples from Jean de La Fontaine’s “Le Lion et le rat” (‘The Lion and the Rat’)—
“Patience et longueur de temps / Font mieux que force ni que rage” (Rage 425-26)
‘Patience and passage of time / Accomplish more than force or rage’—he saw in
them not the authority of La Fontaine—“où est en cela La Fontaine?” ‘Where is La
Fontaine in any of this?’ —but the truth of an action, “la vérité d’un acte de lion”
(426) ‘the truth of a lion act.’ Philippe Met has argued that the pragmatic potential
of Ponge’s formule depends on one aspect of its abstraction, the fact that it is
“détachable de son initiateur et de son contexte” (67) ‘detachable from its originator
and its context.’ Having no connection to a legitimating origin, the formule is a self-

See Philippe Met, Formules de la poésie (‘Formulas of Poetry’) for a superb discussion of the
spatial logic of language as a liberating enclosure in Ponge. (20-25).
10
Austin Hancock identifies in this poem a “non-anthropocentric anthropomorphism” that figures
the sensation of “having the door touch us back” (393).
9
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authorizing utterance, exemplified in the organization of “Le Lion et le rat,” which
begins as follows.
Il faut, autant qu’on peut, obliger tout le monde:
On a souvent besoin d’un plus petit que soi.
De cette vérité deux Fables feront foi,
Tant la chose en preuves abonde.
Entre les pattes d’un Lion
Un Rat sortit de terre assez à l'étourdie.
Le Roi des animaux, en cette occasion,
Montra ce qu'il était, et lui donna la vie. (77)
One must, as much as possible, be kind to all:
We often need someone lesser than we.
Of this truth two fables will persuade,
So abounding in proof is it.
Between a Lion’s paws
A Rat emerged thoughtlessly.
The King of animals, on this occasion,
Showed what he was, and spared him.
The demonstration by example follows the moral, but the exemplary act is outside
any chain of causation or demonstration, appearing even to precede its cause.11 The
lion shows kindness to the rat spontaneously (that is, before he is ensnared and at
the mercy of the rat, who frees him by gnawing the net, all of which comes next in
the fable), making this not a fable of a lesson learned, but of not needing to learn
the lesson of humility expressed in the moral. Such morals, for Ponge, are not rules
to follow but pragmatic utterances that can “montrer aux gens ce qu’il pensent, les
mettre d’accord avec eux-mêmes” (Pratiques 1029) ‘show people what they think,
put them in agreement with themselves.’ Needing no example, the lion ‘showed
what he was.’
How might such an exemplary creature instruct us? To see the problem
more clearly in Ponge’s work, we may look to the pascalian shakeup that opens
In Crises of the Sentence Jan Mieszkowski has recently explained, “propositions articulated in
anticipation of demonstrations required to validate or refute them irremediably betray their own
incompleteness” (50). La Fontaine’s fable “Le Loup et l’agneau” (‘The Wolf and the Lamb’) begins
“La raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure:/ Nous l’allons montrer tout à l’heure” (Fables 53)
‘The reason of the strongest is always the best. We will now show this is so.’ Reading this text as a
fable of the tyranny of western reason, Michel Serres comments, “La raison du plus fort, c’est la
raison tout court” (Hermès 104) ‘The reason of the strongest is reason itself.’ By Serres’s reading,
the moral of the fable is that its moral needs no demonstration but is instead true from the start, “sans
autre forme de procès” (Fables 53) ‘with no other form of trial.’
11
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“Notes pour un coquillage” (‘Notes for a Shell’) and its apparent lesson about
grandeur.
Un coquillage est une petite chose, mais je peux la démesurer en la
replaçant où je la trouve, posée sur l’étendue du sable. Car alors je prendrai
une poignée de sable et j’observerai le peu qui me reste dans la main après
que par les interstices de mes doigts presque toute la poignée aura filé,
j’observerai quelques grains, puis chaque grain, et aucun de ces grains de
sable à ce moment ne m’apparaîtra plus une petite chose, et bientôt le
coquillage formel, cette coquille d’huître ou cette tiare bâtarde, ou ce
“couteau,” m’impressionnera comme un énorme monument, en même
temps colossal et précieux, quelque chose comme le temple d’Angkor,
Saint-Maclou, ou les Pyramides. (Parti 38)
A shell is a small thing, but I can enlarge it beyond measure by putting it
back where I found it, resting on the expanse of sand. For I will then take a
handful of sand and observe the little that remains in my hand after almost
all of it will have run between my fingers, I will observe a few grains, then
each grain, and none of these grains of sand will at that moment appear to
me a small thing, and soon this formal shell, this oyster shell or this volute,
or this “razor” shell, will impress me as an enormous monument, at once
colossal and precious, something like the temple of Angkor, Saint-Maclou,
or the Pyramids.
Though the change in perspective aggrandizes the relative size of the mollusk in its
environment, the text nevertheless expresses the démesure ‘disproportion’ of the
human perspective. Hubristic enough to see lessons in nature, we learn from them
how to be humble. This contradiction cannot be overcome. It is a contradiction at
the core of our actions. For whereas the poem proposes the law of the mollusk for
our moral edification, the mollusk, on the contrary, needs no law other than its own.
No wonder that this poem, as examples of “la disproportion grotesque” (40) ‘the
grotesque disproportion’ of our imagination and our bodies, names a temple, a
church, and the Pyramids. Whether we turn for our laws to the examples of the
natural world around us or to the divinities we created and then mistook for our
creators, the result is the same for Ponge, a form of alienation. We have not yet
found our own law and become, “Cet homme sobre et simple, qui veut vivre selon
sa loi, son équilibre heureux” (Proêmes 230) ‘This sober and simple man, who
wants to live according to his law, his happy equilibrium.’
“Escargots” (‘Snails’) gestures at the resolution of this alienation of our
ethical and imaginative labor, the snail being an example of an organism whose
actions, or expressions, are indistinguishable from its form.

https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol45/iss1/28
DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.2191

12

Hochman: Francis Ponge's Morals and Measures of Human Nature

Leur sécrétion même se produit de telle manière qu’elle se met en forme.
Rien d’extérieur à eux, à leur nécessité, à leur besoin n’est leur œuvre. Rien
de disproportionné—d’autre part—à leur être physique. (Parti 27)
Their very secretion is produced so as to take form. Their work has nothing
exterior to them, to their necessity, to their needs. Nothing
disproportionate—moreover—to their physical being.
The rhetoric of example is explicit and repeated near the end of the poem: “Ainsi
en est-il de tous ceux qui s’expriment d’une façon entièrement subjective sans
repentir” (27, my emphasis) ‘Thus it is with all those who express themselves in an
entirely subjective manner without remorse.’ Or a few lines later: “Mais c’est ici
que je touche à l’un des points principaux de leur leçon” (27, my emphasis) ‘But
here I touch on one of the principal points of their lesson.’ Or yet again, “Et voilà
l’exemple qu’ils nous donnent” (27, my emphasis) ‘And this is the example they
provide.’ At each of these moments, the reader confronts an exhortation to pattern
his or her own behavior on the snail’s peculiar feature, but in the end, this feature
blocks the reading of the snail as an example altogether, for the exemplarity of the
snail, its saintliness, is its obedience to nothing but its own nature: “Mais saints en
quoi: en obéissant précisément à leur nature. Connais-toi donc d’abord toi-même”
(27) ‘But saints how: in obeying exactly their nature. First off, therefore, know
yourself.’ This complicates things for reading because the explicit moral interferes
with the logic of representation, and vice versa. The poem enjoins us to know
ourselves and to express ourselves in a manner suited to our nature, but finding our
way to this lesson requires that we answer to a name that is not our own, that of the
snail.12 And if we cannot learn to obey the Delphic maxim “Know thyself” by
imitating models, since that would be to commit the error that the poem condemns,
this is ultimately because we must in this process develop the ethical independence
of an organism that knows its nature and how to deploy it. Doing what we are told
requires no such understanding, nor does it allow that self-knowledge is not
achieved and expressed once and for all, as if it were “une demeure solide . . . plus
durable qu’eux-mêmes” (27) ‘a solid dwelling . . . more enduring than them,’ but
is instead the ongoing activity of acting in character, harmonizing our commitment
12

In Fables of Responsibility Thomas Keenan identifies this as central to how fables function, taking
as an example the fable of the eagle and the raven in Caxton’s fables of Aesop. “The apostrophe of
reading (which is the signature of the fable as a genre, the moral as address to the reader) is just as
aberrant as the simile of the fable. You are not a raven, not even like a raven, and don’t think you
are. But to learn not to make this figural error, you must compare yourself to the raven, with its
disfigured self-knowledge. […] The fable is structured as a double-bind: to heed its call you must
ignore its call, you must make the mistake the fable denounces” (66).
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to self-knowledge with the means of pursuing and expressing it, allowing us to be
“des êtres dont l’existence même est œuvre d’art” (27) ‘beings whose very
existence is a work of art.’
To explore how a text’s examples might lead to our obeying our own nature,
we may look to two tropes from Le Parti pris des choses that illustrate how nature’s
elements coincide with themselves despite our efforts to make them into metaphors
of human behavior. One of these is water in the poem “De l’eau” (‘On Water’13),
and the other is again the stone from “Le Galet.” From the beginning “De l’eau”
places the human above water: “Plus bas que moi, toujours plus bas que moi se
trouve l’eau. C’est toujours les yeux baissés que je la regarde” (31) ‘Beneath me,
water is always beneath me. I always look at it with lowered eyes.’ Water, always
beneath the narrator, seems to occupy a lower ethical rank because of “cet
hystérique besoin de n’obéir qu’à sa pesanteur, qui la possède comme une idée fixe”
(31) ‘this hysterical need to obey only gravity, which possesses it like une idée fixe.’
But this poem also bears the latent signs of respect for water, “les yeux baissés” (31)
‘lowered eyes,’ as would express the humility of a valet before the king. In the
ambivalent hierarchy of this texte à deux sens14 ‘two-way/two-meaning text’ we
see water as an opportunity to educe an ethical law, but at the same time, we see in
its obedience only to the laws of its physical properties an inalienable behavior that
is like an idée fixe but is no idea at all, ideas being our domain and precisely where
our own attempts at formulating ethical principles run amok, especially when we
make of water an idea about our own behavior.15 When the narrator remarks,
“Toujours plus bas: telle semble être sa devise: le contraire d’excelsior” (31) ‘Ever
lower: so seems to be its motto: the opposite of excelsior,’ the issue here is not that
water aspires to be ever lower and is therefore an ignominious model of perpetual
self-debasement, but instead that water does not aspire at all, much less to the
pursuit of moral perfection called for in “Escargots” (27). The “ever higher” of
excelsior, on the other hand, is a fitting motto for human beings, who can aspire to
The partitive article makes “Some Water” a possible translation.
In Poétique de Francis Ponge (‘Poetics of Francis Ponge’) Bernard Beugnot characterizes
allegory in Ponge as a case of there being “deux sens, sans que l’un nécessairement abolisse l’autre,
même si le plus souvent de l’un à l’autre une hiérarchie tend à s’établir” (9) ‘two meanings, without
one necessarily abolishing the other, even if most often a hierarchy tends to establish itself between
them.’
15
On the relationship between proverbs, lieux communs, and Ponge’s ‘disgust for ideas’ (Proêmes
193) see Philippe Met. “La formule verbale pongienne fournit l’un des meilleurs garde-fous, l’un
des plus sûrs moyens de résistance ou de défense contre la tyrannie des idées et des pensées” (77)
‘the Pongian verbal formula provides one of the best guardrails, one of the best means of resistance
or defense against the tyranny of ideas and thoughts.’ See also Michel Collot (140-44), who notes
that objects (or animals) modeling human behavior enact a movement “de l’objectif au subjectif, du
physique au moral” ‘from the objective to the subjective, from the physical to the moral’ that
threatens the commitment to the object itself, but that it is accompanied by a scientific terminology
that is an extension of non-exact knowledge, which resists the categories of abstraction.
13
14
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more laudable behavior precisely because they are the origin and cause of their own
actions.
Human aspiration requires acting for certain reasons, or as the philosopher
Julia Annas explains regarding virtue, “virtue is not just a habit of copying what
others do but a disposition to act which involves understanding what you do, selfdirectedness, and a drive to improve” (27). The distinction between a body subject
to the laws governing nature and one capable of ethical action is an Aristotelian
one, between the involuntary and the voluntary, and bodies that do not have the
principle of action within them do not aspire to excellence, to the “living and faring
well” defined in the Nicomachean Ethics as happiness, the self-justifying end of
human action, performed “in accordance with the appropriate excellence” (14-15).
Of the involuntary Aristotle explains, “that is compulsory of which the moving
principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person
who acts—or, rather, is acted upon, e.g. if he were to be carried somewhere by a
wind” (48). Whereas the grain of sand in “Le Galet” is carried by the wind, the
human visitor to the landscape is not solely compelled by the physical laws
governing material nature but is “a moving principle or begetter of his actions”
(59).16 Gravity is among those laws to which we are subject, of course (“Certes,
tout au monde connaît ce besoin” [Parti 31] ‘To be sure, everything in the world
knows this need’), but it does not operate in that area of our behavior where laws
are not determined for us, or those laws that we are free to obey or not and that
solicit our practical reason.17
Often translated as disposition or state of character, hexis is for Aristotle
both cause and effect of our actions, something within us that disposes us toward
certain kinds of actions and that is also formed by those actions in the course of our
ethical development, which cannot be a matter of copying others (or copying
examples) because it is the expression of our aspiration to self-directedness.
Though water is disposed invariably to follow the effects of gravity and
evaporation—the competing influence of the earth, and a moon and sun that are
“jaloux” (Parti 32) ‘jealous’—this scientific notion of disposition excludes the
rational principle of aspiration to faring well, which requires that we move past
doing what we are told, and that we learn to act more and more in accordance with
our character. Ponge’s poetics of the nonhuman, though respectful of the silence of
nature, names reason as the representative of nature in human beings, and clamors
See Sarah Broadie, Ethics With Aristotle: “We are natural substances whose essential nature is to
act, feel and think as voluntary agents. Such is the view of human reality that emerges in Aristotle’s
Ethics” (130).
17
See Lionel Cuillé’s commentary on Darwinism and Ponge. “Ce que Ponge privilégie c’est la
volonté (politique) de l’homme qui lui permettra de s’affranchir de l’ordre naturel pour établir un
ordre social plus juste” (240) ‘Ponge privileges the (political) will of man that will allow him to free
himself from the natural order so as to establish a more just social order.’
16
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for it to speak up and be heard by us, at once self-expression and self-knowledge,
as we see in “Des Raisons d’écrire” (‘Reasons to Write’).
nous avons observé que la Nature autrement puissante que les hommes fait
dix fois moins de bruit, et que la nature dans l’homme, je veux dire la raison,
n’en fait pas du tout.
Eh bien! Ne serait-ce qu’à nous-mêmes nous voulons faire entendre la
voix d’un homme. (Proêmes 195-96).
we have noticed that Nature, powerful in a different way from how men are,
makes ten times less noise, and that nature in man, by which I mean reason,
makes none at all.
Well then! If only to ourselves we want to make the voice of a man heard.
Formulating gravity as the law of inverse squares or as a fable of virtue and
vice, we miss opportunities to make the voice of practical reason heard, through the
hypocritical and ethically empty claim to mastery of the laws to which we are
ourselves subjected, on the one hand, or through our attachment to imitation of
ethical examples, on the other. In the first case, we overlook ethical responsibility.
In the second case, we misplace it. “De l’eau,” in figuring two kinds of law
(physical behavior of substances and ethical conduct, physis and nomos) at the same
time and incompatibly, reminds us that our form of life does not appear in the
examples of the text, nor is its field of action exhausted by the forces that move us
and other bodies. The form of life particular to us takes shape instead as our
dispositions toward the contradictions of texts (written and read), which arise from
our contradictory disposition toward the natural world, to which we are disposed
but which we presume to be at our disposal for our practical and moral ends. These
dispositions—toward a text’s meanings, and toward natural contexts—are
regulated and revealed by the same gestures and habits that develop “la notion
propre de l’homme: la parole et la morale. L’humanisme” (Parti 27), ‘the proper
notion of man: speech and morality. Humanism,’ which is to say, those that reveal
our human nature to others and to ourselves. To read the poem “De l’eau” requires
not that we choose between figures of the laudable and the contemptible, but that
we see the asymmetry between virtue and vice, and the insolubility of the literal
and figurative in the poem. “Toujours plus bas: telle semble être sa devise: le
contraire d’excelsior” (Parti 31) ‘Ever lower: so seems to be its motto: the opposite
of excelsior’. Water seems to have a motto, but appearances, we know from “Le
Galet,” are deceiving. Twice called a besoin ‘need’ and three times called a vice, in
neither case does the behavior of water express an aspiration to be lower, no more
than a person’s vicious response to lust or lack reflects a commitment to baseness.
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The human excelsior, on the other hand, expresses the human aspiration to act better
and to live better. And this is not an aspiration to be above something else, or to be
greater than something else, but to be greater than one was at a previous stage of
one’s ethical formation, to be, or show, more and more what one is.
As we have seen, at the end of “Le Galet” the narrator measures linguistic
expression with respect to nature, reflecting on the too-little accomplished by a text
that is too much what it is. However, as the text follows the diminishing size of the
stone, which day by day is smaller and smaller, we notice it is only ever measured
against—so only ever smaller than—itself: “Enfin, de jour en jour plus petit mais
toujours sûr de sa forme, aveugle, solide et sec dans sa profondeur, son caractère
est de ne pas se laisser confondre mais plutôt réduire par les eaux” (56, my
emphasis) ‘In the end, day after day smaller but always sure of its form, blind, solid,
and dry deep down, its character is to not be absorbed but only reduced by water.’
The ethical model of unfolding one’s character is figured here as always being one’s
own “plus petit que soi,” becoming ‘smaller than one is,’ which paradoxically
makes one “plus grand” ‘greater.’
Il en sort plus petit, mais entier, et, si l’on veut, plus grand, puisque ses
proportions ne dépendent aucunement de son volume. (56, emphasis in the
original)
It comes out smaller, but whole, and, if you like, greater, because its
proportions do not at all depend on its volume.
The irony of the stone is that the more eroded it is, the more it shows its
resistance, and the more it reveals itself as whole through changes that solidify and
affirm its eidos ‘form’, since this process of change and identity is the material
behavior that is the stone, the irreducible and unfigurable remainder that neither
water nor any poetic endeavor will ever absorb away. It would seem that we have
run afoul of contradictions in the rhetoric of example we have noted in Ponge,
taking the stone as a metaphor of human self-knowledge (becoming more and more
sure) and the enactment of hexis, ‘one’s own state of character,’ both changing and
not, becoming what one is. Asked by Bernard Groethuysen in a letter whether or
not the poem “Le Galet” was less about the stone itself than the stone as a metaphor
of the human practice of language, Ponge responded, “Je ne voudrais pas que vous
pensiez, et je ne le crois d’ailleurs pas possible, que le Galet tout entier ne soit
qu’une seule ‘métaphore continuée’” (OC I 68) ‘I wouldn’t want you to think, and
moreover I don’t think it’s possible, that le Galet is wholly an extended metaphor.’
Without yielding to Ponge’s authorial opinion here, we can nevertheless see that
our reading confirms it. Entirely unlike the stone, which remains whole, “Le Galet”
is nothing ‘wholly.’ The text is the contradiction of the words qui font défaut ‘that
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aren’t enough,’ and that are also de trop ‘too much,’ doubly disclaiming the
language that would, as Derrida puts it, “donner à connaître la chose même” (295)
‘give the object itself to be known.’ More of a double self-effacement, it is precisely
not what Derrida calls the double effacement (251) ‘double erasure’ by which
metaphor appears as universal truth, the absolute and unlimited currency of the
concept, when we no longer see the metaphor and take it for a proper meaning. The
story of the stone’s usure, “Le Galet” sustains both the resistance of stone and the
metaphor of its resistance, all at once and insolubly. This equilibrium, between
mistaking our traces for nature itself and abject self-effacement, is Ponge’s
humanism: speech and morality, “la notion propre de l’homme” (Parti 27) ‘the
proper notion of man,’ not a proper (i.e. universal) concept but, like other -isms, an
artistic practice, worthy of pride of ownership even, or especially, when we own up
to its artifacts (propre ‘one’s own’). Pride in our contradictory character is the key
to achieving “salut” ‘salvation,’ or well-being (via the Latin “salus” ‘welfare’).
“Quand l’homme sera fier d’être non seulement le lieu où s’élaborent les idées et
les sentiments, mais aussi bien le nœud où ils se détruisent et se confondent, il sera
prêt alors d’être sauvé” (Méthodes 630) ‘When man is proud to be not only the site
where ideas and sentiments are elaborated but also the nexus where they are
destroyed and confounded, then he will be ready to be saved.’ Like the rock-bound
task of Sisyphus, who in his relative successes Ponge imagines happy (Proêmes
208), ‘the art of resisting words,’ practiced by the human and the nonhuman, is
endless, though ours has as its ethical goal, or end, a human being that we can
imagine faring well.
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